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Strong Converse using Change of Measure
Arguments
Himanshu Tyagi† and Shun Watanabe‡
Abstract
The strong converse for a coding theorem shows that the optimal asymptotic rate possible with
vanishing error cannot be improved by allowing a fixed error. Building on a method introduced by Gu
and Effros for centralized coding problems, we develop a general and simple recipe for proving strong
converse that is applicable for distributed problems as well. Heuristically, our proof of strong converse
mimics the standard steps for proving a weak converse, except that we apply those steps to a modified
distribution obtained by conditioning the original distribution on the event that no error occurs. A key
component of our recipe is the replacement of the hard Markov constraints implied by the distributed
nature of the problem with a soft information cost using a variational formula introduced by Oohama.
We illustrate our method by providing a short proof of the strong converse for the Wyner-Ziv problem
and new strong converse theorems for interactive function computation, common randomness and secret
key agreement, and the wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
A coding theorem in information theory characterizes the optimal rate such that there exists a code
of that rate for the problem studied. Often, the first version of such theorems are proved assuming a
vanishing probability of error criterion. This criterion facilitates a simple proof relying on chain rules
and Fano’s inequality. The strong converse holds for a coding theorem if the optimal rate claimed by
the theorem cannot be improved even if a fixed error is allowed. The first strong converse was shown
for the point-to-point channel coding theorem and source coding theorem by Wolfowitz (see [33]). A
general method for proving strong converse for coding theorems in multiterminal information theory was
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2introduced in [3]. This method uses a strong converse for the image-size characterization problem, which
is in turn shown using the blowing-up lemma; see [9] for a comprehensive treatment. The approach based
on blowing-up lemma entails, in essence, changing the code to a list-code with a list-size of vanishing
rate. Related approaches that involve a change in the underlying code but use other measure concentration
techniques have been proposed in [10]1 and [21].
In this work, we present a simple method for proving strong converses for multiterminal problems that
uses very similar steps as the weak converse proofs. Our method consists of two steps, both building
on techniques available in the literature. The first step is a change of measure argument2 due to Gu and
Effros [13], [14]. The key idea is to evaluate the performance of a given code not under the original
product measure, but under another modified measure which depends on the code and under which the
code is error-free. Thus, when the standard rate bounds are applied along with Fano’s inequality, we get
a bound involving information quantities for the tilted measure, but without the Fano correction term for
the error.
In [13], [14], Gu and Effros applied the change of measure argument for proving strong converse for
source coding problems where there exists a terminal that observes all the random variables involved;
a particular example is the Gray-Wyner (GW) problem [12]. A difficulty in extending this approach
to other distributed source coding problems is the Markov chain constraints among random variables
implied by the information structure of the communication. Specifically, these Markov chain constraints
might be violated when the measure is switched. This technical difficulty was circumvented in [31] for
the Wyner-Ahlswede-Ko¨rner (WAK) problem [4], [34], i.e., the problem of lossless source coding with
coded side information, by relating the WAK problem to an extreme case of the GW problem. In this
paper, we develop a more direct and general recipe for applying the change of measure argument to
various distributed coding problems.
The second step of our recipe is the replacement of the hard Markov chain and functional constraints
by soft information cost penalties using variational formulae introduced by Oohama in a series of
papers including [24], [25]. These variational formulae involve optimization over a nonnegative Lagrange
multiplier, with the optimum corresponding to the form with Markov constraints. In fact, when the measure
change step is applied some of the distributions that need to preserved, such as the channel transition
probabilities, may change. These, too, can be accomodated by a KL-divergence cost constraint. At a high
level, we replace all “hard” information constraints by “soft” divergence costs and complete the proof of
1For another use of the Gaussian-Poincare´ inequality in information theory, see [27].
2Our argument differs from the change of measure argument used to prove sphere packing bounds (cf. [9]).
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3strong converse by establishing super- or sub-additivity of the resulting penalized rate functions.
As an illustration of this approach, consider the lossless source coding problem; even though this
problem does not involve any Markov chain constraint, it illustrates the essential ideas involved in our
approach. Suppose that an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) source Zn is compressed to
ϕ(Zn) such that there exists a function ψ satisfying P (ψ(ϕ(Zn)) = Zn) ≥ 1− ε. Let C denote the set
{zn : ψ(ϕ(zn)) = zn} of sequences where no error occurs. The strong converse for the lossless source
coding theorem will be obtained upon showing that the rate of the code is bounded below by entropy
H(Z) asymptotically, irrespective of the value of 0 < ε < 1. To show this, we change the probability
measure to PZ˜n defined by
3
PZ˜n (z
n) = P (Zn = zn|Zn ∈ C) . (1)
This measure is not too far from the original measure under KL-divergence. Indeed,
D(PZ˜n‖PZn) ≤ log
1
1− ε.
On the other hand, under PZ˜n , the error probability of the code (ϕ,ψ) is exactly zero. Thus, by mimicking
the standard weak converse arguments, we have
log |C| ≥ H(Z˜n).
The next step is to single-letterize H(Z˜n), which now does not correspond to a product measure and
may not be super-additive on its own. We circumvent this difficulty by adding a divergence cost to get
1
n
log |C| ≥ 1
n
H(Z˜n) +
α
n
[
D(PZ˜n‖PZn)− log(1/(1 − ε))
]
≥ min
PZ˜
[
H(Z˜) + αD(PZ˜‖PZ)
]− α log(1/(1 − ε))
n
for any α > 0. The second inequality uses a simple super-additivity property that we show in Proposition 1
for conditional entropy. The proof of strong converse is completed by using the following variational
formula for entropy:
H(Z) = sup
α>0
min
PZ˜
[
H(Z˜) + αD(PZ˜‖PZ)
]
.
Using our recipe, we can obtain simple proof for some known strong converse results and can, in fact,
obtain several new strong converse results, including for problems involving interactive communication.
3In [13], [14], the new distribution had a more complicated form.
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4The first result we present is the lossy source coding with side information problem, also known as the
Wyner-Ziv (WZ) problem [36]. The strong converse for the WZ problem was proved only recently in [25].
We use our general recipe for proving a strong converse to give a more compact proof for the WZ strong
converse which, we believe, is more accessible than the original proof of [25].4 The second problem
we consider is the interactive function computation problem (cf. [26], [22], [6]). Prior to our work, a
strong converse for this well-studied problem was unavailable. A technical difficulty in showing such a
result arises from the multiple auxiliary random variables and Markov chain constraints that appear in
the optimal sum-rate. A related result was shown in [7] in a slightly different setting, but the information
odometer approach used in [7] is technically much more involved than our simple change of measure
argument.
In addition to the two source coding problems mentioned above, we also apply our recipe for problems
of generating common randomness and secret key with interactive communication [2], [29]. The strong
converse for these problems with interactive communication were unavailable prior to our work; see [17]
and the extended version of [21] for partial results. Since these problems involve a total variation distance
constraint, we need some additional tricks for changing measure. In particular, we seek a replacement
for the correctly decoded set of sequences C. We illustrate the essential idea using a simple random
number generation problem, which is also known as the intrinsic randomness problem (cf. [15]). Suppose
that an i.i.d. source Zn is converted to K = ϕ(Zn) such that the total variation distance criterion
d(PK ,Punif) ≤ δ is satisfied, where Punif is the uniform distribution of the range K of K. Consider the
set
C =
{
zn : log
1
PK (ϕ(zn))
≥ log |K| − log(2/(1 − δ))
}
(2)
comprising elements zn mapped to high entropy density realizations of K. It can be seen from our
analysis in Section V that
P (Zn ∈ C) ≥ 1− δ
2
.
Thus, by changing the measure to PZ˜n given in (1) but using the set C of (2), we have D(PZ˜n‖PZn) ≤
log(2/(1 − δ)). Furthermore, for this changed measure, the random variable K˜ = ϕ(Z˜n) has the min-
entropy at least log |K| − 2 log(2/(1 − δ)), which implies
log |K| ≤ Hmin(K˜) + 2 log(2/(1 − δ))
4The proof in [25] provides a stronger result in form of an explicit lower bound on the exponent of the probability of
correctness.
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5≤ H(K˜) + 2 log(2/(1 − δ))
≤ H(Z˜n) + 2 log(2/(1 − δ)).
The entropy term on the right-side can be bounded using the sub-additivity of entropy. However, the
resulting single-letterized measure may deviate from the original PZ , which needs to be retained. To that
end, we add a divergence cost to get
1
n
log |K| ≤ 1
n
H(Z˜n)− α
n
[
D
(
PZ˜n‖PZn
)− log(2/(1 − δ))
]
+
2 log(2/(1 − δ))
n
≤ max
PZ˜
[
H(Z˜)− αD(P
Z˜
‖PZ)
]
+
(α+ 2) log(2/(1 − δ))
n
for any α > 0. The strong converse for the random number generation problem follows from the
variational formula
H(Z) = inf
α>0
max
PZ˜
[
H(Z˜)− αD(PZ˜‖PZ)
]
.
The final setting we consider is the wiretap channel [35], [8]. The strong converse theorem for degraded
wiretap channel was proved in [16] (see [28] for a partial strong converse). However, its extension to
general wiretap channel has remained open.5 By using our general recipe, we provide a proof for the
strong converse theorem for the general wiretap channel. Compared to other problems mentioned above,
this problem is more involved, and requires a few more tricks including expurgation of messages to
replace average guarantees with worst-case guarantees and construction of changed measure using a set
with bounded log-likelihood ratio of wiretappers observation probability and its probability given the
message. Nevertheless, given the technical difficulties in prior attempts, this is a relatively simple proof.
Overall, our main message in this work is that strong converses can be proven using similar techniques
as those used for proving weak converses, applied after an appropriate measure change. However, we
need to work with new variational forms of capacity formulae where the hard information constraints
are replaced with soft KL-divergence costs.
A conceptually related approach for proving strong converse was recently proposed by Kosut and
Kliewer in [20]. In their approach, the strong converse for a given network is reduced first to the
weak converse by adding an extra edge of vanishing rate to the network, which allows negligible
cooperation among users. Then, the strong converse will follow if the so-called edge removal property
holds, namely the capacity is not changed when the extra edge is removed. Since Markov chain constraints
5The argument in [32] has a technical flaw, and we are unable to verify the technically involved proof in [11].
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6in multiterminal problems stem from distributed nature of the problems, the replacement of those Markov
chain constraints with soft KL-divergence costs in our recipe is, at high-level, similar to adding a “soft
edge” to increase cooperation among the terminals. However, the soft divergence cost seems to be a more
versatile tool; in particular, it allows us to handle even interactive communication.
Another related recent work is that of Jose and Kulkarni [18], [19]. Their approach considers the
performance of the optimal code for a coding problem and poses it as an optimization problem, which
is further bounded by the value of a linear program obtained by relaxing some constraints. Even though
this approach provides tight converse bounds implying strong converse for some problems, applicability
of this approach to problems involving auxiliary random variables is yet unclear.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing a few simple results in the
next section, which will be used throughout the paper. The strong converse for the WZ problem is given
in Section III and for the function computation problem in Section IV. The next two sections contain
problems involving total variation constraints, with the common randomness generation and secret key
agreement in Section V, and the wiretap channel problem in Section VI. We conclude with discussions
on exponential strong converse and extensions in the final section.
Notation: Throughout the paper, we restrict to discrete random variables taking finitely many values
and denote the random variable with a capital letter, for instance X, its range set with the corresponding
caligraphic, e.g. X , and each realization with small letter, e.g. x. For information measures, we follow
the standard notations in [9]: The entropy, the KL divergence, and the mutual information are denoted
by H(X), D(P‖Q), and I(X ∧ Y ), respectively. The (normalized) total variation distance between
two distributions P and Q is denoted by d(P,Q) := 12
∑
x |P (x) − Q (x) |. For a sequence Xn =
(X1, · · · ,Xn) of random variables, we denote X−j = (X1, . . . ,Xj−1) and X+j = (Xj+1, . . . ,Xn), where
X−1 and X
+
n are regarded as the empty string. The indicator function is denoted by 1[·]. Other notations
will be introduced when necessary, but are standard notations used in the multiterminal information theory
literature.
II. TECHNICAL TOOLS
We begin by assembling the simple tools that we will use repeatedly in our proofs. The first is perhaps
a new observation; the other two are standard.
Typically, we use additivity of (conditional) entropy for independent random variables for proving
converse bounds. However, in our proofs, once we change the measure, the resulting random variables
need not be independent. Nevertheless, the following simple result fills the gap and shows that if we add
a divergence cost for measure change, the sum is super-additive.
May 15, 2018 DRAFT
7Proposition 1. For i.i.d. PXnY n with common distribution PXY and any PX˜nY˜ n , we have
H(X˜n|Y˜ n) +D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PXnY n) ≥ n
[
H(X˜J |Y˜J) +D(PX˜J Y˜J‖PXY )
]
,
where J ∼ unif({1, ..., n}) is the time-sharing random variable and is assumed to be independent of
all the other random variables involved.
Proof. The left-side can be expressed as
H(X˜n|Y˜ n) +D(PX˜n|Y˜ n‖PXn|Y n|PY˜ n) +D(PY˜ n‖PY n).
The first two terms satisfy
H(X˜n|Y˜ n) +D(PX˜n|Y˜ n‖PXn|Y n|PY˜ n) =
∑
xn,yn
PX˜nY˜ n (x
n, yn) log
1
PXn|Y n (xn|yn)
=
n∑
j=1
∑
x,y
PX˜j Y˜j (x, y) log
1
PX|Y (x|y)
= n
∑
x,y
PX˜J Y˜J (x, y) log
1
PX|Y (x|y)
= nH(X˜J |Y˜J) + nD(PX˜J |Y˜J‖PX|Y |PY˜J ),
and the third,
D(PY˜ n‖PY n) =
n∑
j=1
D(PY˜j |Y˜ −j
‖PY |PY˜ −j )
≥
n∑
j=1
D(PY˜j‖PY )
≥ nD(PY˜J‖PY ),
which completes the proof.
The next tool we present is essential for handling the distributed settings we consider. It allows us
to replace the “hard” Markov chain and function constraints in our bounds with “soft” costs using a
variational formula introduced by Oohama (cf. [25]) in this context. This is important since these hard
constraints may not hold once we change the measure. We describe this approach in an abstract form
below; proofs for specific variants needed for our results are similar and have been relegated to the
appendix.
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8Let G(PZ1Z2) be a bounded continuous function of PZ1Z2 . Define
6
G(PZ1Z2) = inf
PU|Z1
E
[
G(PZ1Z2|U )
]
.
Note that by the support lemma [9], it suffices to restrict the infimum to U with |U| ≤ |Z1|, and thereby
the inf can be replaced by min using compactness of the finite dimensional probability simplex. The
next result we present is a variational formula for G(PZ1Z2) that allows us to replace the minimization
over U satisfying the Markov chain condition U −◦− Z1 −◦− Z2 to that over all PU |Z1Z2 .
Proposition 2. Let G(PZ1Z2) be a bounded continuous function over the probability simplex P(Z1×Z2).
Then, the function G(PZ1Z2) satisfies
G(PZ1Z2) = sup
α>0
min
PU|Z1Z2
[
E
[
G(PZ1Z2|U )
]
+ αI(U ∧ Z2|Z1)
]
. (3)
Proof. The left-side is greater than or equal to the right-side since, for every α > 0, the left-side is
obtained by restricting the inner minimization on the right to the distribution satisfying U −◦− Z1 −◦− Z2.
To prove the other direction, first note that I(U ∧Z1|Z2) can be written as D(PUZ1Z2‖PU |Z1PZ1PZ2|Z1).
Given α > 0, let Pα
U |Z1Z2
attain the inner minimum in (3) for α. Since the function G(·) is bounded,
say it lies in an interval [a, b], the same holds for the function G(·). Therefore, it must hold that
D(PαUZ1Z2‖PαU |Z1PZ1Z2) ≤ (b−a)/α. Let P˜UZ1Z2 = PαU |Z1PZ1Z2 . Since G(·) is continuous7 on a compact
domain, it is also uniformly continuous. Therefore, there exists a function ∆(t) satisfying ∆(t)→ 0 as
t→ 0 such that
E
[
G(PαZ1Z2|U )
]
≥ E
[
G(P˜Z1Z2|U)
]
−∆((b− a)/α)
≥ G(PZ1Z2)−∆((b− a)/α).
Thus, we obtain the required inequality by taking α→∞, which completes the proof.
The variational form above can be used to handle even multiple Markov relations by adding a similar
cost for each constraint. Furthermore, we can even handle functional constraints such as H(Z1|U,Z2) = 0
by adding an additional cost αH(Z1|U,Z2). These extensions of Proposition 2 will be used in our proofs.
Additionally, we also need a cost to account for the deviation from the underlying fixed source
and channel distributions that occur when we apply our change of measure arguments. The following
6We abbreviate G(PZ1Z2|U (·|U)) as G(PZ1Z2|U ).
7We are assuming G(·) is continuous with respect to the total variation distance. Then, it is also continuous with respect to
the KL divergence using the Pinsker inequality.
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9alternative variational formula for G(PZ1Z2) will be handy:
Proposition 3. Let G(PZ1Z2) be a bounded continuous function over the probability simplex P(Z1×Z2).
Then, we have
G(PZ1Z2) = sup
α>0
min
PU˜Z˜1Z˜2
[
E
[
G(PZ˜1Z˜2|U˜)
]
+ α
(
D(PZ˜1Z˜2‖PZ1Z2) + I(U ∧ Z2|Z1)
)]
.
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2; instead of proving this meta-result, we will prove our
specific variational formulae in the appendix.
The final result we recall is a standard tool for single-letterization from [9, pg. 314]– its power lies in
its validity for arbitrary distributions. For random variables Xn, Y n, U with an arbitrary joint distribution
PXnY nU , it holds that
H(Xn|U)−H(Y n|U) =
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|X−i , Y +i , U)−H(Yi|X−i , Y +i , U). (4)
III. LOSSY SOURCE CODING WITH SIDE-INFORMATION
In the lossy source coding problem with side-information, the goal is to compress a source sequence
to enable its recovery within a pre-specified distortion at a receiver with side-information. Formally, for
a given source PXY on a finite alphabet X ×Y , a lossy source code with side-information consists of an
encoder ϕ : X n →M and a decoder ψ :M×Yn → Zn, where Z is the reproduction alphabet. Consider
a distortion measure d : X × Z → [0,Dmax] and its n-fold extension d(xn, zn) =
∑n
i=1 d(xi, zi). A
rate-distortion pair (R,D) is ε-achievable if, for every sufficiently large n, there exists a code (ϕ,ψ)
such that
P (d(Xn, ψ(ϕ(Xn), Y n)) > nD) ≤ ε (5)
and
1
n
log |M| ≤ R. (6)
Let RWZ(ε|PXY ) be the closure of the set of all ε-achievable rate-distortion pairs. Define
RWZ(PXY ) :=
⋂
0<ε<1
RWZ(ε|PXY ).
May 15, 2018 DRAFT
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The following characterization8 of RWZ(PXY ) was given in [36]:
RWZ(PXY ) = {(R,D) : ∃ (U,Z) s.t. |U| ≤ |X |+ 1,
U −◦−X −◦− Y,Z −◦− (U, Y )−◦−X,
R ≥ I(U ∧X|Y ),E[d(X,Z)] ≤ D}.
The set RWZ(PXY ) is closed and convex and can be expressed alternatively using tangent lines as follows:
RWZ(PXY ) =
⋂
µ≥0
{(R,D) : R+ µD ≥ RµWZ(PXY )},
where
RµWZ(PXY ) := min
{
I(U ∧X|Y ) + µE[d(X,Z)] :
∃ (U,Z) s.t. |U| ≤ |X |, U −◦−X −◦− Y,Z −◦− (U, Y )−◦−X}.
The optimal rate region above involves Markov relations, which will become intractable once we change
the measure. Furthermore, once we change the measure and obtain a single-letter bound, the source
distribution may deviate from PXY . To circumvent these difficulties, we switch to the following variational
form of RµWZ(PXY ), which will be proved in Appendix A:
RµWZ(PXY ) = sup
α>0
Rµ,αWZ (PXY ), (7)
where
Rµ,αWZ (PXY ) := min
PU˜X˜Y˜ Z˜
[
I(U˜ ∧ X˜|Y˜ ) + µE[d(X˜, Z˜)] + αD(PU˜ X˜Y˜ Z˜‖QU˜XY Z˜) +D(PX˜Y˜ ‖PXY )
]
(8)
= min
PU˜X˜Y˜ Z˜
[
I(U˜ ∧ X˜ |Y˜ ) + µE[d(X˜, Z˜)]
+
(
(α+ 1)D(PX˜Y˜ ‖PXY ) + αI(U˜ ∧ Y˜ |X˜) + αI(Z˜ ∧ X˜ |U˜ , Y˜ )
)]
(9)
and QU˜XY Z˜ = PZ˜|U˜Y˜ PU˜ |X˜PXY is the distribution induced from each PU˜X˜Y˜ Z˜ . By the support lemma [9],
the range U of U˜ can be restricted to |U| ≤ |X ||Y||Z|.
Remark 1. In effect, we have replaced the “hard constraints” imposed by the requirements of preserving
the input source distribution and the Markov relations between the communication sent, the source and
the reconstructed estimate with “soft” divergence penalties which are amenable to single-letterization
8In fact, we can restrict Z to be a function of (U,Y ).
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using standard chain rules. The factor (α+1) instead of α is only to enable a technical manipulation in
the proof of Theorem 4 below. However, semantically, the bound can be understood by just considering
an extra αD(PU˜ X˜Y˜ Z˜‖QU˜XY Z˜) cost which captures all the aforementioned constraints. In fact, a factor
in the form of any function f(α) of α that blows-up to infinity as α tends to infinity will work, since
we take α → ∞ at the end. In the definition of Rµ,αWZ (PXY ), the divergence form (8) is heuristically
appealing and affords a simple proof of the variational formula (7) (see Appendix A); on the other hand,
the mutual information form (9) is amenable to single-letterization in the proof of Theorem 4 below.
We are now in a position to prove the strong converse. The main step is to show the following result,
which is obtained simply by using the super-additivity of the lower bound obtained after measure change.
Theorem 4. For every n ∈ N, µ ≥ 0, and α > 0, we have
Rµ,αWZ (P
n
XY ) ≥ nRµ,αWZ (PXY ).
As a corollary, we obtain the strong converse for the lossy source coding with side-information problem,
which was shown in [25] using a different, more complicated method.
Corollary 5. For every 0 < ε < 1, we have RWZ(ε|PXY ) = RWZ(PXY ).
Proof of Corollary 5: For a given code (ϕ,ψ) satisfying (5) and (6), define
D = {(xn, yn) : d(xn, ψ(ϕ(xn), yn)) ≤ nD}.
Further, let PX˜nY˜ n be defined by
PX˜nY˜ n (x
n, yn) :=
PnXY (x
n, yn)1[(xn, yn) ∈ D]
PnXY (D)
.
Then, the excess distortion probability of the same code (ϕ,ψ) for the source (X˜n, Y˜ n) is exactly 0,
which implies Z˜n = ψ(ϕ(X˜n), Y˜ n) satisfies E[d(X˜n, Z˜n)] ≤ nD. Thus, by mimicking the standard
weak converse proof, we have
n(R+ µD) ≥ I(S˜ ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n) + µE[d(X˜n, Z˜n)],
where S˜ = ϕ(X˜n). Also,
D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PnXY ) = log
1
PnXY (D)
≤ log 1
1− ε .
May 15, 2018 DRAFT
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Thus, by noting that costs I(S˜ ∧ Y˜ n|X˜n) and I(Z˜n ∧ X˜n|S˜, Y˜ n) are both 0, we have
n(R+ µD) ≥ I(S˜ ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n) + µE[d(X˜n, Z˜n)] + ((α+ 1)D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PnXY )
+ αI(S˜ ∧ Y˜ n|X˜n) + αI(Z˜n ∧ X˜n|S˜, Y˜ n))− (α+ 1) log 1
1− ε
≥ Rµ,αWZ (PnXY )− (α+ 1) log
1
1− ε.
Therefore, by Theorem 4, we have
R+ µD ≥ Rµ,αWZ (PXY )−
(α+ 1)
n
log
1
1− ε (10)
for every µ ≥ 0 and α > 0, whereby the corollary follows from (7).
Proof of Theorem 4: By setting
G1(PX˜nY˜ n) := H(X˜
n|Y˜ n) + αH(Y˜ n|X˜n) + (α+ 1)D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PnXY ),
G2(PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n) := −H(X˜n|U˜ , Y˜ n) + µE[d(X˜n, Z˜n)] + α
(−H(Y˜ n|U˜ , X˜n) + I(Z˜n ∧ X˜n|U˜ , Y˜ n)),
for given PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n , we can write
Rµ,αWZ (P
n
XY ) = min
PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n
[
G1(PX˜nY˜ n) +G2(PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n)
]
.
Fix arbitrary PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n . By Proposition 1, G1(PX˜nY˜ n) can be lower bounded as
9
G1(PX˜nY˜ n) ≥ nG1(PX˜J Y˜J ). (11)
For G2(PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n), note that
−H(X˜n|U˜ , Y˜ n) = −
n∑
j=1
H(X˜j |U˜ , X˜−j , Y˜ n)
≥ −
n∑
j=1
H(X˜j |U˜ , X˜−j , Y˜ +j , Yj),
= −nH(X˜J |U˜J , J, Y˜J ),
where U˜j = (U˜ , X˜
−
j , Y˜
+
j ). Also, E[d(X˜
n, Z˜n)] = nE[d(X˜J , Z˜J )]. For the remaining terms in G2, we
have
−H(Y˜ n|U˜ , X˜n) + I(Z˜n ∧ X˜n|U˜ , Y˜ n)
9By a slight abuse of notation, G1(PX˜J Y˜J ) is defined by replacing PX˜nY˜ n and P
n
XY with PX˜J Y˜J and PXY in the definition
of G1(PX˜nY˜ n).
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= −H(X˜n|U˜ , Y˜ n, Z˜n) +H(X˜n|U˜ )−H(Y˜ n|U˜)
=
n∑
j=1
[−H(X˜j |U˜ , X˜−j , Y˜ n, Z˜n) +H(X˜j |U˜ , X˜−j , Y˜ +j )−H(Y˜j|U˜ , X˜−j , Y˜ +j )]
≥ n[−H(X˜J |U˜J , J, Y˜J , Z˜J ) +H(X˜J |U˜J , J)−H(Y˜J |U˜J , J)]
= n
[−H(Y˜J |U˜J , J, X˜J ) + I(Z˜J ∧ X˜J |U˜J , J, Y˜J)],
where the second identity uses (4). Upon combining the observations above, we get
G2(PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n) ≥ nG2(PU˜JJX˜J Y˜J Z˜J ). (12)
Since (11) and (12) hold for an arbitrary PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n , the proof is complete.
IV. INTERACTIVE FUNCTION COMPUTATION PROBLEM
The second problem we consider entails the computation of a function f of (X,Y ) using interactive
communication. For the ease of presentation, we limit ourselves to protocols with 2-rounds of commu-
nication, but our analysis extends to protocols with bounded (independent of n) rounds.
For a given source PXY on a finite alphabet X ×Y , an (2-round) interactive communication protocol
pi with inputs (Xn, Y n) consists of mappings ϕ1 : X n → {0, 1}l1 and ϕ2 : Yn×{0, 1}l1 → {0, 1}l2 ; the
length of such a protocol pi is l1+ l2. The random transcript of the protocol is denoted by Π = (Π1,Π2)
where Π1 = ϕ1(X
n), and Π2 = ϕ2(Y
n,Π1).
A protocol pi ε-computes a function f : X ×Y → Z if we can form estimates Fn1 = ψ1(Xn,Π2) and
Fn2 = ψ2(Y
n,Π1) such that
P (f(Xi, Yi) = F1i = F2i, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n) ≥ 1− ε.
A rate R > 0 is an ε-achievable communication rate for f if, for all n sufficiently large, there exists an
interactive communication protocol pi of length |pi| less than nR that ε-computes f . The infimum over
all ε-achievable communication rates for f is denoted by Rf (ε|PXY ). The supremum over ε ∈ (0, 1) of
all ε-achievable communication rates for f is denoted by Rf (PXY ).
The following characterization of Rf (PXY ) was given in [26]:10
Rf (PXY ) = min I(U, V ∧X|Y ) + I(U, V ∧ Y |X), (13)
10See [22], [6] for the extension to multiple rounds.
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where the minimum is over all U, V satisfying U −◦−X −◦− Y , V −◦− (Y,U) −◦−X; H(f(X,Y )|Y,U) =
H(f(X,Y )|X,U, V ) = 0; and |U| ≤ |X |, |V| ≤ |Y||X |.
Remark 2. The right-side of (13) is referred to as the intrinsic information complexity of f (using 2-
round communication protocols) in computer science literature (cf. [6]). By noting the Markov relations
U −◦−X −◦− Y and V −◦− (Y,U)−◦−X, we can obtain the following equivalent expression for it:
I(U ∧X|Y ) + I(V ∧ Y |U,X),
which is perhaps more commonly used in the information theory literature (cf. [26], [22]). In a similar
vein, we use the extrinsic information complexity I(U, V ∧X,Y ) to describe the results in Section V,
which, too, can be expressed alternatively using the aforementioned Markov relations.
In the manner of Proposition 3, we can replace the “hard” Markov chain and functional constraints
with “soft” divergence penalties to get (see Appendix B for the proof)
Rf (PXY ) = sup
α>0
Rαf (PXY ), (14)
where
Rαf (PXY ) := min
PU˜V˜ X˜Y˜
[
I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ X˜ |Y˜ ) + I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ Y˜ |X˜) + αD(PU˜ V˜ X˜Y˜ ‖QU˜ V˜ XY )
+ (α+ 2)D(P
X˜Y˜
‖PXY ) + α
(
D(P
U˜ |X˜Y˜ ‖PU˜ |X˜ |PX˜Y˜ ) +H(F˜ |Y˜ , U˜) +H(F˜ |X˜, U˜ , V˜ )
)]
= min
PU˜V˜ X˜Y˜
[
I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ X˜|Y˜ ) + I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ Y˜ |X˜) + (2α + 2)D(PX˜Y˜ ‖PXY )
+ α
(
2I(U˜ ∧ Y˜ |X˜) + I(V˜ ∧ X˜|Y˜ , U˜ ) +H(F˜ |Y˜ , U˜) +H(F˜ |X˜, U˜ , V˜ ))],
F˜ = f(X˜, Y˜ ), and QU˜ V˜ XY = PV˜ |U˜Y˜ PU˜ |X˜PXY is the distribution induced from each PU˜ V˜ X˜Y˜ . The
ranges U and V of U˜ and V˜ can be restricted to |U| ≤ |X ||Y| and |V| ≤ |X |2|Y|2. The two forms
described above have different utilities as described in Remark 1. As in the previous section, we divide
the proof of strong converse into two parts. The main technical component is the following result.
Theorem 6. For every n ∈ N and α > 0, we have
Rαf (P
n
XY ) ≥ nRαf (PXY ),
where in defining Rαf (P
n
XY ) we use F˜
n = (f(X˜1, Y˜1), ..., f(X˜n, Y˜n)).
As corollary, we get the strong converse theorem for function computation.
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Corollary 7. For every 0 < ε < 1, we have Rf (ε|PXY ) = Rf (PXY ).
The proof of corollary follows from Theorem 6 using similar steps as the proof of Corollary 5 where
the changed measure PX˜nY˜ n is now obtained by conditioning on the set of inputs for which no error
occurs, i.e., the set
D = {(xn, yn) : ψ1(xn, ϕ2(yn, ϕ1(xn))) = ψ2(yn, ϕ1(xn)) = (f(x1, y1), ..., f(xn, yn))}.
We close this section with a proof of Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6: By setting
G1(PX˜n,Y˜ n) :=
[
H(X˜n|Y˜ n) +D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PXnY n)
]
+ (2α+ 1)
[
H(Y˜ n|X˜n) +D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PXnY n)
]
and
G2(PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ nF˜n) := −H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ , V˜ )−H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ )− 2αH(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ )
+ αI(V˜ ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜) + αH(F˜n|Y˜ n, U˜) + αH(F˜n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ )
for given PU˜V˜ X˜nY˜ n with F˜i = f(X˜i, Y˜i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can write
Rαf (P
n
XY ) = min
PU˜V˜ X˜nY˜ n
[
G1(PX˜n,Y˜ n) +G2(PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ nF˜n)
]
.
Fix arbitrary PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ n . By Proposition 1, we get
G1(PX˜nY˜ n) ≥ nG1(PX˜J ,Y˜J ), (15)
where J is distributed uniformly over {1, ..., n}. ForG2(PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ nF˜n), since removing condition increases
entropy, we have
−H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ , V˜ )−H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ ) ≥ −nH(X˜J |Y˜J , U˜J , J, V˜ )− nH(Y˜J |X˜J , U˜J , J, V˜ )
where U˜j = (U˜ , X˜
−
j , Y˜
+
j ). Furthermore, noting that
− 2H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜) + I(V˜ ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜) +H(F˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ ) +H(F˜n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ )
= 2[H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ )−H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜)] + [H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ )−H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ , V˜ )]
−H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜)−H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ ) +H(F˜n|Y˜ n, U˜) +H(F˜n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ )
= 2[H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ )−H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜)] + [H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ )−H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ , V˜ )]
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−H(X˜n, F˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ )−H(Y˜ n, F˜n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ ) +H(F˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ ) +H(F˜n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ )
= 2[H(X˜n|U˜)−H(Y˜ n|U˜)] + [H(Y˜ n|U˜ , V˜ )−H(X˜n|U˜ , V˜ )]
−H(X˜n|Y˜ n, F˜n, U˜ )−H(Y˜ n|X˜n, F˜n, U˜ , V˜ ),
where we used the fact that F˜n is function of (X˜n, Y˜ n) to append F˜n in the second equality. Thus, by
using (4) twice, we obtain
− 2H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ ) + I(V˜ ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ ) +H(F˜n|Y˜ n, U˜) +H(F˜n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ )
≥ 2n(H(X˜J |U˜J , J)−H(Y˜J |U˜J , J)) + n(H(Y˜J |U˜J , J, V˜ )−H(X˜J |U˜J , J, V˜ ))
− nH(X˜J |Y˜J , F˜J , U˜J , J)− nH(Y˜J |X˜J , F˜J , U˜J , J, V˜ )
= −2nH(Y˜J |X˜J , U˜J , J) + nI(V˜ ∧ X˜J |Y˜J , U˜J , J) + nH(F˜J |Y˜J , U˜J , J) + nH(F˜J |X˜J , U˜J , J, V˜ ),
where we used the fact F˜J = f(X˜J , Y˜J) to remove unnecessary F˜J in the previous identity. Upon
combining the bounds above, we obtain
G2(PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ nF˜n) ≥ nG2(PU˜JJV˜ X˜J Y˜J F˜J ). (16)
Since (15) and (16) hold for arbitrary PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ n , the proof is complete.
V. COMMON RANDOMNESS GENERATION AND SECRET KEY AGREEMENT
We now move to the closely related problems of common randomness generation and secret key
agreement. In these problems, an additional challenge arises due to the presence of a total variation
distance constraint. We circumvent this difficulty by replacing the total variation distance constraint by
a constraint on log-likelihood; the resulting set is used in our measure change arguments. A similar
approach will be used later for the wiretap channel strong converse where, too, the security constraint
poses a similar challenge.
We begin with the common randomness problem and extend to the secret key agreement case using
the connection between the two problems. Note that while the measure change arguments presented here
prove the strong converse for secret key agreement with limited communication, the strong converse
for secret key agreement with unlimited communication is available in [30]. In fact, the conditional
independence testing bound of [30] yields even the precise second-order term (cf. [17]); it is unclear if
our measure change approach can do the same.
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A. Common Randomness Generation
Consider a source PXY on a finite alphabet X × Y . An (2-round) interactive common randomness
generation protocol11 pi with input (Xn, Y n) consists of mappings ϕ1 : X n → {0, 1}l1 and ϕ2 : Yn ×
{0, 1}l1 → {0, 1}l2 ; the length |pi| of such a protocol pi is l1 + l2. The random transcript of the protocol
is denoted by Π = (Π1,Π2), where Π1 = ϕ1(X
n) and Π2 = ϕ2(Y
n,Π1).
Given a protocol, a pair of random variables (K1,K2) taking values in a finite set K constitute an
(ε, δ)-CR recoverable from pi if there exist ψ1 : X n × {0, 1}l2 → K and ψ2 : Yn × {0, 1}l1 → K such
that K1 = ψ1(X
n,Π2), K2 = ψ2(Y
n,Π1), and
P (K1 6= K2) ≤ ε, (17)
d(PK1 ,Punif) ≤ δ, (18)
where Punif is the uniform distribution on K. The quantity log |K| denotes the length of the CR.
A rate pair (Rc, Rr) is (ε, δ)-achievable if, for all n sufficiently large, there exists a protocol pi of
length |pi| ≤ nRc that recovers an (ε, δ)-CR of length log |K| ≥ nRr. Let RCR(ε, δ|PXY ) be the closure
of the set of all (ε, δ)-achievable rate pairs. Define
RCR(PXY ) :=
⋂
0<ε,δ<1
RCR(ε, δ|PXY ).
The following characterization of RCR(PXY ) was given in [2]:
RCR(PXY ) =
{
(Rc, Rr) : ∃(U, V ) s.t. |U| ≤ |X |+ 1, |V| ≤ |X ||Y| + 1, U −◦−X −◦− Y, V −◦− (Y,U)−◦−X
Rc ≥ I(U, V ∧X|Y ) + I(U, V ∧ Y |X), Rr ≤ I(U, V ∧X,Y )
}
The set RCR(PXY ) is closed and convex, and it can be expressed alternatively using tangent lines as
follows:
RCR(PXY ) =
⋂
µ≥0
{
(Rr, Rc) : Rr − µRc ≤ RµCR(PXY )
}
,
where
RµCR(PXY ) := max
{
I(U, V ∧X,Y )− µ(I(U, V ∧X|Y ) + I(U, V ∧ Y |X)) :
∃(U, V ) s.t. |U| ≤ |X |, |V| ≤ |X ||Y|, U −◦−X −◦− Y, V −◦− (Y,U)−◦−X}. (19)
11For ease of presentation, we restrict to 2-rounds. Our approach easily extends to higher (but fixed) number of rounds.
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As before, we circumvent the Markov chain conditions by using the following alternative form:
RµCR(PXY ) = inf
α>0
Rµ,αCR (PXY ), (20)
where (see Remark 1)
Rµ,αCR (PXY ) := max
PU˜V˜ X˜Y˜
[
I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ X˜, Y˜ )− µ(I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ X˜ |Y˜ ) + I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ Y˜ |X˜))
− αD(PU˜ V˜ X˜Y˜ ‖QU˜ V˜ XY )−D(PU˜ V˜ |X˜Y˜ ‖PU˜ |X˜PV˜ |Y˜ U˜ |PX˜Y˜ )− 2µD(PX˜Y˜ ‖PXY )
]
= max
PU˜V˜ X˜Y˜
[
I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ X˜, Y˜ )− µ(I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ X˜|Y˜ ) + I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ Y˜ |X˜))
− (α+ 2µ)D(PX˜Y˜ ‖PXY )− (α+ 1)
(
I(U˜ ∧ Y˜ |X˜) + I(V˜ ∧ X˜|Y˜ , U˜ ))], (21)
and Q
U˜V˜ XY
= P
V˜ |U˜Y˜ PU˜ |X˜PXY is the distribution induced from each PU˜ V˜ X˜Y˜ . The ranges U and V of
U˜ and V˜ can be restricted to |U| ≤ |X ||Y| and |V| ≤ |X |2|Y|2.
Theorem 8. For every n ∈ N, µ ≥ 0, and α > 0, we have
Rµ,αCR (P
n
XY ) ≤ nRµ,αCR (PXY ).
Corollary 9. For every 0 < ε, δ < 1 with ε+ δ < 1, we have RCR(ε, δ|PXY ) = RCR(PXY ).
Proof of Corollary 9: For a given protocol pi and (ε, δ)-CR (K1,K2) satisfying (17) and (18), we
first replace the uniformity constraint (18) with a constraint on log-likelihood. Specifically, for a given
γ > 0, which will be specified later, let
Tγ :=
{
k ∈ K : log 1
PK1 (k)
≥ log |K| − γ
}
. (22)
Then, by (18) and the standard argument in the information-spectrum methods (cf. [15, Lemma 2.1.2]),
we have
δ ≥ d(PK1 ,Punif)
≥ PK1
(T cγ )− Punif (T cγ )
≥ PK1
(T cγ )− 2−γ . (23)
We now define the set D over which our CR generation protocol behaves ideally. Let
D := {(xn, yn) : ψ1(xn, ϕ2(yn, ϕ1(xn))) ∈ Tγ , ψ1(xn, ϕ2(yn, ϕ1(xn))) = ψ2(yn, ϕ1(xn))}. (24)
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By (17) and (23), for γ = log 21−ε−δ , we have
PnXY (D) ≥ 1− PK1
(T cγ )− P (K1 6= K2)
≥ 1− ε− δ − 2−γ
=
1− ε− δ
2
. (25)
Denote by PX˜nY˜ n the pmf
PX˜nY˜ n (x
n, yn) :=
PnXY (x
n, yn)1[(xn, yn) ∈ D]
PnXY (D)
. (26)
Then, (25) implies
D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PnXY ) = log
1
PnXY (D)
≤ log 2
1− ε− δ . (27)
Consider an execution of protocol pi for input (X˜n, Y˜ n) ∼ PX˜nY˜ n . Set Π˜1 = ϕ1(X˜n), Π˜2 = ϕ2(Y˜ n, Π˜1),
Π˜ = (Π˜1, Π˜2), K˜1 = ψ1(X˜
n, Π˜2), and K˜2 = ψ2(Y˜
n, Π˜1). Note that K˜1 = K˜2 with probability 1.
Furthermore, since the support of PK˜1 satisfies supp(PK˜1) ⊆ Tγ , we have
PK˜1 (k) =
1
PnXY (D)
∑
(xn,yn)∈D:
ψ1(x
n,ϕ2(y
n,ϕ1(x
n)))=k
PnXY (x
n, yn)
≤ PK1 (k)
PnXY (D)
≤ 2
γ
PnXY (D)|K|
for every k ∈ supp(PK˜1). Thus, we get
Hmin(PK˜1) = mink∈supp(PK˜1 )
log
1
PK˜1 (k)
≥ log |K| − 2 log 2
1− ε− δ ,
where we also used (25) in the inequality.
By noting Hmin(PK˜1) ≤ H(K˜1), we have
n(Rr − µRc)− 2 log 2
1− ε− δ ≤ log |K| − µ|pi| − 2 log
2
1− ε− δ
≤ H(K˜1)− µH(Π˜)
≤ H(Π˜, K˜1)− µ
(
H(Π˜|X˜n) +H(Π˜|Y˜ n))
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= H(Π˜, K˜2)− µ
(
H(Π˜, K˜2|X˜n) +H(Π˜, K˜2|Y˜ n)
)
≤ I(Π˜, K˜2 ∧ X˜n, Y˜ n)− µ
(
I(Π˜, K˜2 ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n) + I(Π˜, K˜2 ∧ Y˜ n|X˜n)
)
≤ I(Π˜, K˜2 ∧ X˜n, Y˜ n)− µ
(
I(Π˜, K˜2 ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n) + I(Π˜, K˜2 ∧ Y˜ n|X˜n)
)
− (α+ 1)(I(Π˜1 ∧ Y˜ n|X˜n) + I(Π˜2, K˜2 ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n, Π˜1))
− (α+ 2µ)D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PnXY ) + (α+ 2µ) log
2
1− ε− δ
≤ Rµ,αCR (PnXY ) + (α+ 2µ) log
2
1− ε− δ ,
where we used a well-known property of interactive communication in the third inequality (eg. see [23,
Eq. (3.2)]); the identity follows from the fact that K˜1 and K˜2 are recoverable perfectly from (X˜
n, Π˜) and
(Y˜ n, Π˜), respectively, and K˜1 = K˜2 with probability 1; and we used the fact that costs I(Π˜1 ∧ Y˜ n|X˜n)
and I(Π˜2, K˜2∧ X˜n|Y˜ n, Π˜1) are both 0 and (27) in the fifth inequality; in the last inequality, we regarded
Π˜1 and (Π˜2, K˜2) as U˜ and V˜ , respectively. Finally, by applying Theorem 8, we have
Rr − µRc ≤ Rµ,αCR (PXY ) +
(α+ 2µ + 2)
n
log
2
1− ε− δ ,
which together with (20) imply the strong converse.
Proof of Theorem 8: First note that we can expand
I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ X˜n, Y˜ n) = I(U˜ ∧ X˜n) + I(V˜ ∧ Y˜ n|U˜ ) + I(U˜ ∧ Y˜ n|X˜n) + I(V˜ ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜).
Then, by setting
G1(PX˜nY˜ n) := H(X˜
n)− µ[H(X˜n|Y˜ n) +D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PnXY )]− (α+ µ)[H(Y˜ n|X˜n) +D(PX˜nY˜ n‖PnXY )]
and
G2(PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ n) := −H(X˜n|U˜) + I(V˜ ∧ Y˜ n|U˜) + µ
(
H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ , V˜ ) +H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ ))
+ α
(
H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜)− I(V˜ ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜))
for given PU˜V˜ X˜nY˜ n , we can write
Rµ,αCR (P
n
XY ) = max
PU˜V˜ X˜nY˜ n
[
G1(PX˜nY˜ n) +G2(PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ n)
]
.
Fix arbitrary PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ n . By noting H(X˜
n) ≤ nH(X˜J) and by using Proposition 1, we get
G1(PX˜nY˜ n) ≤ nG1(PX˜J Y˜J ), (28)
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where J is distributed uniformly over {1, . . . , n}. For G2(PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ n), by using (4), we have
−H(X˜n|U˜) + I(V˜ ∧ Y˜ n|U˜) = H(Y˜ n|U˜)−H(X˜n|U˜)−H(Y˜ n|U˜ , V˜ )
≤ n[H(Y˜J |U˜J , J)−H(X˜J |U˜J , J)−H(Y˜J |U˜J , J, V˜ )],
where U˜j = (U˜ , X˜
−
j , Y˜
+
j ). Also,
H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ , V˜ ) +H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ , V˜ ) ≤ n(H(X˜J |Y˜J , U˜J , J, V˜ ) +H(Y˜J |X˜J , U˜J , J, V˜ )).
Furthermore, by using (4) once more, we obtain
H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜ )− I(V˜ ∧ X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜) = H(Y˜ n|U˜)−H(X˜n|U˜ ) +H(X˜n|Y˜ n, U˜ , V˜ )
≤ n(H(Y˜J |U˜J , J)−H(X˜J |U˜J , J) +H(X˜J |Y˜J , U˜J , J, V˜ ))
= n
(
H(Y˜J |X˜J , U˜J , J)− I(V˜ ∧ X˜J |Y˜J , U˜J , J)
)
.
Upon combining the bounds above, we obtain
G2(PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ n) ≤ nG2(PU˜JJV˜ X˜J Y˜J ). (29)
Since (28) and (29) hold for arbitrary PU˜ V˜ X˜nY˜ n , the proof is complete.
Remark 3. When randomization is allowed, the achievable region is given by
R˜CR(PXY ) =
{
(Rc, Rr) : ∃ t ≥ 0 s.t. (Rc − t, Rr − t) ∈ RCR(PXY )
}
.
We can extend the proof above to randomized protocols easily by appending two independent i.i.d.
sources An and Bn (taking values in sufficiently large alphabets A and B) to Xn and Y n, respectively.
By Corollary 9 we obtain RCR(ε, δ|PXAY B) = RCR(PXAY B). Also, noting that (cf. [2])
⋃
PAB
RCR(PXAY B) = R˜CR(PXY ),
where the union is taken over all distributions such that A and B are independent, we have the strong
converse even with randomized protocols.
B. Secret Key Agreement
Next, we consider the secret key agreement problem. The formulation and analysis is very similar to
the common randomness generation problem; we only highlight the differences. Specifically, an (ε, δ)-SK
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(K1,K2) recoverable from a protocol pi is an (ε, δ)-CR with the uniformity condition (18) replaced by
the secrecy condition
d(PK1Π,Punif × PΠ) ≤ δ. (30)
An (ε, δ)-achievable secret key rate pair (Rc, Rs) and the rate regions RSK(ε, δ|PXY ) and RSK(PXY )
are defined exactly as before. The following characterization of RSK(PXY ) was given in [29]:
RSK(PXY ) =
{
(Rc, Rs) : ∃(U, V ) s.t. |U| ≤ |X |+ 1, |V| ≤ |X ||Y| + 1, U −◦−X −◦− Y, V −◦− (Y,U)−◦−X
Rc ≥ I(U, V ∧X|Y ) + I(U, V ∧ Y |X),
Rs ≤ I(U, V ∧X,Y )− I(U, V ∧X|Y )− I(U, V ∧ Y |X)
}
.
Define RµSK(PXY ) and R
µ,α
SK (PXY ) analogously to (19) and (21), respectively. Then, it can be easily
verified that
RµSK(PXY ) = R
µ+1
CR (PXY ),
Rµ,αSK (PXY ) = R
µ+1,α
CR (PXY ).
Thus, Theorem 8 can be rewritten as follows.
Theorem 10. For every n ∈ N, µ ≥ 0, and α > 0, we have
Rµ,αSK (P
n
XY ) ≤ nRµ,αSK (PXY ).
Furthermore, by using Theorem 10, we have the following strong converse theorem.
Corollary 11. For every 0 < ε, δ < 1 with ε+ δ < 1, we have RSK(ε, δ|PXY ) = RSK(PXY ).
Proof of Corollary 11: The proof is mostly the same as the proof of Corollary 9; we only highlight
the modifications required. Instead of the set defined by (22), we consider
Tγ :=
{
(k, τ) : log
1
PK1|Π (k|τ )
≥ log |K| − γ
}
.
We can verify that
δ ≥ PK1Π
(T cγ )− 2−γ .
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In place of (24), define the set D as
D := {(xn, yn) : (ψ1(xn, ϕ2(yn, ϕ1(xn))), ϕ1(xn), ϕ2(yn, ϕ1(xn))) ∈ Tγ ,
ψ1(x
n, ϕ2(y
n, ϕ1(x
n))) = ψ2(y
n, ϕ1(x
n))
}
.
Then, for the changed measure (26), we recover the bound (27). Also,
Hmin(PK˜1Π˜|PΠ˜) := min(k,τ)∈supp(PK˜1Π˜)
log
1
PK˜1|Π˜ (k|τ )
≥ log |K| − 2 log 2
1− ε− δ .
Therefore, upon noting Hmin(PK˜1Π˜|PΠ˜) ≤ H(K˜1|Π˜), we obtain
n(Rs − µRc)− 2 log 2
1− ε− δ ≤ H(K˜1|Π˜)− µH(Π˜)
= H(Π˜, K˜1)− (µ + 1)H(Π˜)
≤ Rµ,αSK (PnXY ) + (α+ 2µ + 2) log
2
1− ε− δ .
Finally, the strong converse follows from Theorem 10.
VI. WIRETAP CHANNEL
A wiretap channel code enables reliable transmission of a message over a noisy channel while keeping
it secure from an eavesdropper who can see another noisy version of transmissions. Formally, given a
discrete memoryless channel (DMC) W : X → Y × Z , an (N,n, ε, δ)-wiretap code for W consists
of a (possibly randomized) encoder ϕ : {1, ..., N} → X n and a decoder ψ : Yn → {1, ..., N} such
that when a message M distributed uniformly over {1, ..., N} is transmitted over the channel as Xn =
ϕ(M), the estimate Mˆ = ψ(Y n) has probability of error satisfying P(Mˆ 6= M) ≤ ε and leakage
d(PMZn ,PM × PZn) ≤ δ.
A rate R > 0 is (ε, δ)-achievable if there exists an (⌊2nR⌋, n, ε, δ)-wiretap code for all n sufficiently
large. The (ε, δ)-wiretap capacity Cs(ε, δ|W ) is the supremum over all (ε, δ)-achiavable rates. The wiretap
capacity Cs(W ) is the infimum of Cs(ε, δ|W ) over all ε, δ ∈ (0, 1). The following characterization of
Cs(W ) was derived in [8]:
Cs(W ) = max
PUXY Z :
PY Z|XU=W
[
I(U ∧ Y )− I(U ∧ Z)],
where the cardinality |U| of U can be restricted to be |U| ≤ |X |. Using Proposition 3, the expression on
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the right above can be written alternatively as12
Cs(W ) = inf
α>0
Cαs (W ), (31)
where
Cαs (W ) = max
PU˜X˜Y˜ Z˜
[
I(U˜ ∧ Y˜ )− I(U˜ ∧ Z˜)− αD(PY˜ Z˜|X˜U˜‖W |PX˜U˜ )
]
,
where the cardinality |U| of U can be restricted to be |U| ≤ |X ||Y||Z|. The next theorem shows that the
quantity Cαs (W ) satisfies the required sub-additivity property.
Theorem 12. Consider a DMC W : X → Y × Z such that W (y, z|x) = W1(y|x)W2(z|x). For every
n ∈ N and α > 0,
C2αs (W
n) ≤ nCαs (W ).
As a corollary, we obtain the strong converse for wiretap channel.
Corollary 13. For every 0 < ε, δ < 1 with ε+ δ < 1, we have Cs(ε, δ|W ) = Cs(W ).
Proof of Corollary 13: Consider an (N,n, ε, δ)-wiretap code with a randomized encoder ϕ and (de-
terministic) decoder ψ . Note that without loss of generality we may assumeW (y, z|x) =W1(y|x)W2(z|x)
since the error and secrecy criterion, respectively, depend only on the marginals (Xn, Y n) and (Xn, Zn).
The first step in our proof is to convert the average probability of error and secrecy requirements to a
worst-case version. Specifically, since
ε+ δ ≥ P(Mˆ 6=M) + d(PMZn,PM × PZn)
≥ 1
N
N∑
m=1
[
P(Mˆ 6= m|M = m) + d(PZn|M=m,PZn)
]
,
there exists a subset M′ of size |M′| ≥ (1− ε− δ)N/(1 + ε+ δ) such that for every message m ∈ M′,
P(Mˆ 6= m|M = m) + d(PZn|M=m,PZn) ≤
1 + ε+ δ
2
.
For m ∈M′, consider the sets
Am = {yn : ψ(yn) = m}
12The proof of (31) is very similar to that of other variational formulae such as (7) and is omitted.
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and, for γ > 0 specified later,
Bm =
{
zn : log
PZn|M (z
n|m)
PZn (zn)
≤ γ
}
.
The set Bm denotes, roughly, the set of observations that do not reveal much information to the wiretapper
about the message m – the wiretapper cannot distinguish reliably if the observation was generated from
PZn|M=m or from PZn . By the standard argument in the information-spectrum methods (cf. [15]), the
set Bm satisfies
PZn (Bcm) ≤ 2−γ .
Furthermore, from the definition of the total variation distance, we further have
PZn|M=m (Bcm) ≤ 2−γ + d(PZn|M=m,PZn)
for every m ∈ M′. Therefore, upon choosing 2−γ = (1− ε− δ)/4, we have
P (Y n ∈ Am, Zn ∈ Bm|M = m) ≥ 1− PY n|M=m (Acm)− PZn|M=m (Bcm)
≥ 1− ε− δ
4
for every m ∈ M′. Denote η = 1− (1− ε− δ)/4 and by Cm the set of xn ∈ supp(PXn|M=m) such that
P (Y n ∈ Am, Zn ∈ Bm|Xn = xn) ≥ 1−√η, (32)
which satisfies
P (Xn ∈ Cm|M = m) ≥ 1−√η (33)
by the reverse Markov inequality. We now define our modified random variables for which the code
is perfectly error-free and has a small leakage of information to the wiretapper; however, unlike the
original random variables satisfying the Markov constraint M −◦−Xn −◦− (Y n, Zn), the modified random
variables do not satisfy the Markov constraint (see also Remark 4). Specifically, consider random variables
(U˜ , X˜n, Y˜ n, Z˜n) such that U˜ is uniformly distributed on M′, and
PX˜n|U˜ (x
n|m) = PXn|M (x
n|m)1[xn ∈ Cm]
PXn|M (Cm|m)
;
PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜ (y
n, zn|xn,m) = PY nZn|Xn (y
n, zn|xn)1[yn ∈ Am, zn ∈ Bm]
PY nZn|Xn (Am × Bm|xn)
, ∀xn ∈ Cm.
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Using the conditional independence assumption W (y, z|x) =W1(y|x)W2(z|x), we further get that
PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜ (y
n, zn|xn,m) = PY n|Xn (y
n|xn)1[yn ∈ Am]
PY n|Xn (Am|xn)
· PZn|Xn (z
n|xn)1[zn ∈ Bm]
PZn|Xn (Bm|xn)
,
whereby
PZ˜n|X˜nU˜ (z
n|xn,m) = PZn|Xn (z
n|xn)1[zn ∈ Bm]
PZn|Xn (Bm|xn)
. (34)
Since U˜ = ψ(Y˜ n) with probability 1, we get
logN − log 2
1− ε− δ ≤ log |M
′| ≤ I(U˜ ∧ Y˜ n). (35)
To bound the leakage I(U˜ ∧ Z˜n), note that
I(U˜ ∧ Z˜n) +D(PZ˜n‖PZn) = E
[
log
PZ˜n|U˜ (Z˜
n|U˜)
PZn(Z˜n)
]
≤ max
m∈M′,zn∈Bm
log
PZ˜n|U˜ (z
n|m)
PZn (zn)
≤ log 4
1− ε− δ + maxm∈M′,zn∈Bm log
P
Z˜n|U˜ (z
n|m)
PZn|M (zn|m)
,
where the previous inequality uses the definition of Bm and γ = log 41−ε−δ . For the second term on the
right-side above, for every zn ∈ Bm it holds that
PZ˜n|U˜ (z
n|m)
PZn|M (zn|m)
=
∑
xn∈Cm
PX˜n|U˜ (x
n|m) PZ˜n|X˜nU˜ (zn|xn,m)∑
x′n∈Xn PXn|M (x
′n|m) PZn|Xn (zn|x′n)
≤
∑
xn∈Cm
PX˜n|U˜ (x
n|m) PZ˜n|X˜nU˜ (zn|xn,m)∑
x′n∈Cm
PXn|M (x′n|m) PZn|Xn (zn|x′n)
=
∑
xn∈Cm
PXn|M (x
n|m) PZn|Xn (zn|xn) /{PXn|M (Cm|m) PZn|Xn (Bm|xn)}∑
x′n∈Cm
PXn|M (x′n|m) PZn|Xn (zn|x′n)
≤ 1
(1−√η)2 ,
where the second equality uses (34) and the final inequality is by (32) and (33). Using the bounds above,
we get
I(U˜ ∧ Z˜n) ≤ log 4
1− ε− δ + 2 log
1
1−√η .
Combining this bound with (35), for every α > 0 and with
∆(ε, δ) = 2 log
1
1− ε− δ + 2 log
1
1−
√
1− (1− ε− δ)/4 + 3,
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we get
logN ≤ I(U˜ ∧ Y˜ n)− I(U˜ ∧ Z˜n) + ∆(ε, δ)
≤ C2αs (W n) + 2αD(PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n|PX˜nU˜ ) + ∆(ε, δ)
≤ nCαs (W ) + 2αD(PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n|PX˜nU˜ ) + ∆(ε, δ), (36)
where the final bound uses Theorem 12. It only remains to bound the divergence term on the right-side
above. To that end, note
D(PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n|PX˜nU˜ ) =
∑
xn,m
PX˜nU˜ (x
n,m) log
1
PY nZn|Xn (Am × Bm|xn)
≤ log 1
1−√η ,
where we have used the fact that support of PX˜n|U˜=m is Cm and (32). This bound along with (36) yields
logN ≤ nCα(W ) +
(
2 log
1
1− ε− δ + (2α+ 2) log
1
1−
√
1− (1− ε− δ)/4 + 3
)
,
which yields the strong converse by (31).
Remark 4. Unlike the standard choice of auxiliary random variable in the wiretap channel, the random
variables (U˜ , X˜n, Y˜ n, Z˜n) in the above proof do not satisfy the Markov relation U˜ −◦− X˜n −◦− (Y˜ n, Z˜n).
Instead, we have added the cost D(PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n|PX˜nU˜ ).
Proof of Theorem 12: For any distribution PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n , note first that (see [9, Lemma 17.12])
I(U˜ ∧ Y˜ n)− I(U˜ ∧ Z˜n) = n[I(U˜ ∧ Y˜J |VJ , J)− I(U˜ ∧ Z˜J |VJ , J)], (37)
where J is distributed uniformly over {1, ..., n} and Vj = (Y˜ −j , Z˜+j ). Next, consider
D(PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n|PX˜nU˜ ) = D(PY˜ n|X˜nU˜‖W n1 |PX˜nU˜ ) +D(PZ˜n|Y˜ nX˜nU˜‖W n2 |PY˜ nX˜nU˜ ). (38)
The first term on the right is bounded below by
D(PY˜ n|X˜nU˜‖W n1 |PX˜nU˜ )−D(PZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n2 |PX˜nU˜ )
= E
[
log
W n2 (Z˜
n|X˜n)
W n1 (Y˜
n|X˜n)
]
+H(Z˜n|X˜n, U˜ )−H(Y˜ n|X˜n, U˜)
=
n∑
j=1
[
E
[
log
W2(Z˜j |X˜j)
W1(Y˜j|X˜j)
]
+H(Z˜j |X˜n, U˜ , Vj)−H(Y˜j |X˜n, U˜ , Vj)
]
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=
n∑
j=1
[
D(PY˜j |X˜nU˜Vj‖W1|PX˜nU˜Vj )−D(PZ˜j |X˜nU˜Vj‖W2|PX˜nU˜Vj )
]
,
where the second equality follows from (4). For the second term on the right-side of (38), we have
D(PZ˜n|Y˜ nX˜nU˜‖W n2 |PY˜ nX˜nU˜ ) =
n∑
j=1
D(PZ˜j |Z˜+j Y˜ nX˜nU˜
‖W2|PZ˜+j Y˜ nX˜nU˜ )
≥
n∑
j=1
D(PZ˜j |X˜nU˜Vj‖W2|PX˜nU˜Vj ),
where the inequality uses the convexity of D(P‖Q) in (P,Q). Using these bounds with (38), it follows
that
D(PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n|PX˜nU˜ ) ≥
n∑
j=1
D(PY˜j |X˜nU˜Vj‖W1|PX˜nU˜Vj )
≥
n∑
j=1
D(PY˜j |X˜jU˜Vj‖W1|PX˜jU˜Vj )
= nD(PY˜J |X˜J U˜VJJ‖W1|PX˜J U˜VJJ). (39)
Also,
D(PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n|PX˜nU˜ ) ≥ D(PZ˜n|Y˜ nX˜nU˜‖W n2 |PY˜ nX˜nU˜ )
=
n∑
j=1
D(PZ˜j |Z˜+j Y˜ nX˜nU˜
‖W2|PZ˜+j Y˜ nX˜nU˜ )
≥
n∑
j=1
D(PZ˜j |Y˜jX˜jU˜Vj‖W2|PY˜jX˜jU˜Vj )
= nD(PZ˜J |Y˜JX˜J U˜VJJ‖W2|PY˜JX˜J U˜VJJ). (40)
The bounds (39) and (40) yield
2D(PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n|PX˜nU˜ ) ≥ nD(PY˜J Z˜J |X˜J U˜VJJ‖W |PX˜J U˜VJJ).
Consequently, we have
I(U˜ ∧ Y˜ n)− I(U˜ ∧ Z˜n)− 2αD(PY˜ nZ˜n|X˜nU˜‖W n|PX˜nU˜ )
≤ n[I(U˜ ∧ Y˜J |VJ , J)− I(U˜ ∧ Z˜J |VJ , J)− αD(PY˜J Z˜J |X˜J U˜VJJ‖W |PX˜J U˜VJJ)
]
≤ nCαs (W ),
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where, in the last inequality, we removed (VJ , J) by taking the maximum over realizations of (VJ , J).
Since PU˜X˜nY˜ nZ˜n is arbitrary, the proof is completed.
VII. DISCUSSION
Our proofs of strong converse have followed a common recipe where an important step is to establish
the super-additivity and sub-additivity, respectively, of the lower and upper bounds involving the changed
measure. To facilitate this, we have used appropriately crafted variational formulae for these bounds
which allowed us to establish the desired additivity properties. These results, Theorem 4, Theorem 6,
Theorem 8, Theorem 10, and Theorem 12, along with Proposition 1 may be of independent interest.
We restricted our treatment to the case of random variables taking finitely many values. But this
assumption was used only to establish the variational formulae (7), (14), (20), and (31), and our results
will hold whenever these formulae can be established. In particular, a technical difficulty in generalizing
these formulae is to replace the use of uniform continuity of the information quantities in our proofs
with suitable conditions.
The strong converse claim considered in this paper is that the capacity remains unchanged even if a
constant error 0 < ε < 1 is allowed. A stronger notion of strong converse, termed the exponential strong
converse or Arimoto converse, requires that the error converges to 1 exponentially rapidly when the rate
exceeds the capacity [5]. In fact, our proofs give exponential strong converses as well. For instance, in
the lossy source coding with side-information, by setting ε = 1 − 2−ξn in the final bound (10) of the
proof of Corollary 5, we can show that any code with excess distortion probability less than 1 − 2−ξn
must satisfy
R+ µD ≥ Rµ,αWZ (PXY )− (α+ 1)ξ. (41)
Suppose that R+ µD ≤ RµWZ(PXY )− 2ν for some ν > 0. The variational formula (7) implies that there
exists sufficiently large α such that RµWZ(PXY ) ≤ Rµ,αWZ (PXY ) + ν. Thus, if we take ξ so that ξ < να+1 ,
then (41) is violated, which implies that the excess distortion probability must be larger than 1− 2−ξn.
However, the above argument does not give an explicit lower bound for the exponent of the convergence
speed. Such an explicit bound has been derived recently by Oohama for certain multiterminal problems
(cf. [24], [25]).
Even though we have illustrated the utility of our recipe only for several representative problems,
we believe that this recipe provides strong converse theorems for any problems as long as single-letter
characterizations of the optimal rates under weak converse are known. An interesting future direction will
be an application of this change-of-measure argument to problems such that single-letter characterizations
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of weak converse are unknown. A partial attempt for this problem was made in [14] for centralized coding
problems.13 A research in such a direction will establish a folklore in information theory: Strong converse
holds for any stationary memoryless system.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of variational formaula (7)
The proof is almost the same as the proof of Proposition 2. Clearly, the left-side is greater than or
equal to the right-side. To prove the other direction, for each α > 0, let Pα
U˜X˜Y˜ Z˜
be the minimizer for the
inner minimum on the right-side, and let Qα
U˜XY Z˜
= Pα
Z˜|U˜Y˜
Pα
U˜ |X˜
PXY be the induced distribution. Since
G(PU˜ X˜Y˜ Z˜) = I(U˜ ∧ X˜|Y˜ ) + E[d(X˜, Z˜)] is nonnegative and bounded above by a = log |X |+Dmax, it
must hold that D(Pα
U˜X˜Y˜ Z˜
‖Qα
U˜XY Z˜
) ≤ a
α
. Furthermore, since G(PU˜ X˜Y˜ Z˜) is uniformly continuous, there
exists a function ∆(t) satisfying ∆(t)→ 0 as t→ 0 such that
Rµ,αWZ (PXY ) ≥ G(PαU˜X˜Y˜ Z˜)
≥ G(Qα
U˜XY Z˜
)−∆(a/α)
≥ RµWZ(PXY )−∆(a/α).
Thus, we obtain the desired inequality by taking α→∞, which completes the proof.
B. Proof of variational formula (14)
The proof mimics the one above, but has been included for completeness. As before, it is easy to see
that the left-side is greater than or equal to the right-side. For the other direction, for each α > 0, let
Pα
U˜V˜ X˜Y˜
be the minimizer for the inner minimum on the right-side, and let Qα
U˜V˜ XY
= Pα
V˜ |U˜ Y˜
Pα
U˜ |X˜
PXY
be the induced distribution. Since G(PU˜ V˜ X˜Y˜ ) = I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ X˜|Y˜ ) + I(U˜ , V˜ ∧ Y˜ |X˜) is nonnegative and
bounded above by a = log |X ||Y|, it must hold that
D(Pα
U˜V˜ X˜Y˜
‖Qα
U˜V˜ XY
) ≤ a
α
(42)
and14
HPα(F˜ |Y˜ , U˜ ) ≤ a
α
, HPα(F˜ |X˜, U˜ , V˜ ) ≤ a
α
. (43)
13Instances of strong converses for problems with unknown single-letter characterization of the optimal rate are available; see
[1], [20]. Both these results apply the blowing-up lemma in a non-trivial manner.
14We have put the subscripts in (43) to emphasize the underlying measure.
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Using the compactness of the finite dimensional probability simplex, there exists a subsequence
{Qαi
U˜ V˜ XY
}∞i=1 of {QαU˜V˜ XY }α∈N that converges to Q∗U˜ V˜ XY . By uniform continuity of the entropy, (42)
and (43) imply that the limit point Q∗
U˜V˜ XY
satisfies HQ∗(F |Y, U˜ ) = HQ∗(F |X, U˜ , V˜ ) = 0. Furthermore,
since G(PU˜ V˜ X˜Y˜ ) is also uniform continuous, there exists a function ∆(t) satisfying ∆(t)→ 0 as t→ 0
such that
Rαif (PXY ) ≥ G(PαiU˜ V˜ X˜Y˜ )
≥ G(Qαi
U˜ V˜ XY
)−∆(a/αi).
Thus, by taking the limit i→∞, we have
sup
α>0
Rαf (PXY ) ≥ G(Q∗U˜ V˜ XY )
≥ Rf (PXY ),
which completes the proof.
C. Proof of variational formula (20)
The proof is a minor variant of those of (7) and (14). We only need to observe that the function
G(PU˜ V˜ X˜Y˜ ) = I(U˜ , V˜ ∧X˜, Y˜ )−µ
(
I(U˜ , V˜ ∧X˜|Y˜ )+I(U˜ , V˜ ∧Y˜ |X˜)) is bounded above by a = log |X ||Y|
and below by b = −µ log |X ||Y|. With this observation, the same arguments go through.
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